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Privacy amplification (PA) is an indispensable component in classical and quantum cryptography.
Error correction (EC) and data compression (DC) algorithms are also indispensable in classical and
quantum information theory. We here study quantum algorithms of these three types (PA, EC, and
DC) in the one-shot scenario, and show that they all become equivalent if modified properly. As
an application of this equivalence, we take previously known security bounds of PA, and translate
them into coding theorems for EC and DC which have not been obtained previously. Further, we
apply these results to simplify and improve our previous result that the two prevalent approaches
to the security proof of quantum key distribution (QKD) are equivalent. We also propose a new
method to simplify the security proof of QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy amplification (PA) algorithms are an indis-
pensable component in classical and quantum cryptog-
raphy [1–4]. The goal of these algorithms is to generate
a random bit string that is completely unknown to out-
side, from a bit string which may be partially leaked to
outside. On the other hand, error correction (EC) and
data compression (DC) algorithms are also indispensable
in classical and quantum information theory [5].
We here study quantum algorithms of these three types
(PA, EC, and DC) in the one-shot scenario, and show
that they all become equivalent, if modified properly.
This equivalence is made possible by modifying these
three algorithms in the following two points. First, we
modify EC and DC algorithm by adding quantum side
information [6, 7]; that is, we give the decoder an aux-
iliary quantum state, in addition to the usual classical
codeword or the usual classical compressed data. Sec-
ond, in order to evaluate the security of PA, we use a
relatively new security index put forward by Ko¨nig et al.
[8] based on the purified distance [9], while most litera-
ture use the conventional criterion called the ε-security
(see e.g. Ref. [1]), based on the trace distance. We stress
that we do not lose the security essentially by using this
new criterion, because it is a sufficient condition for the
conventional ε-security. It can also be shown to be nearly
as tight as the ε-security (see Section III A 3 for details).
We note that this result, the equivalence of the three
algorithms, is a refinement of the results of our previ-
ous paper [7]. Previously, we have shown the security
bounds of PA, which are called the leftover hashing lem-
mas (LHLs), can be derived from a coding theorem of EC
with quantum side information [7]. On the other hand, in
the present manuscript, we demonstrate that PA and EC
are not only directly connected, but are in fact equiva-
lent, if we define the security of PA properly. In addition,
we also prove that DC with quantum side information is
also equivalent to these two algorithms.
Then we demonstrate the usefulness of this equivalence
with two applications.
As the first application, we take previously known se-
curity bounds (i.e., LHLs) of PA, and convert them into
new coding theorems for EC and DC with quantum side
information. Specifically, we consider three types of hash
functions F which are widely used for PA, namely, the
universal2 [10], the almost universal2 [11], and the almost
dual universal2 functions [12, 13]. Then we convert their
LHLs into the coding theorems of EC and DC using the
dual function of F . To the best of our knowledge, these
coding theorems are new results that have not been ob-
tained previously.
We proceed to apply these results to the security proof
of quantum key distribution (QKD) [14]. In the field
of QKD, there are two major approaches to the security
proof, called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL)-based ap-
proach [1], and the phase error correction (PEC)-based
approach [15–19]. Previously, we have shown that these
two approaches are in fact equivalent mathematically [7].
In this paper, we simplify and improve this proof by ex-
ploiting the equivalence of the three algorithms (PA, EC,
and DC). The proof here is improved in that it is valid
for a lager class of hash functions; that is, the equiva-
lence holds for the case where the random function F for
PA is almost universal2 and almost dual universal2, while
previously we treated only the case of universal2 [7].
Further, utilizing the knowledge gained in this new
proof, we propose a method to simplify the PEC-based
proof. That is, we propose to evaluate the random-
ness of Alice’s phase degrees of freedom by the smooth
max-entropy, rather than by the phase error rate. This
method has an additional merit that every step of the
proof becomes equivalent to that of the corresponding
LHL-based proof. As a result, one is guaranteed to reach
exactly the same security bound as in the LHL-based
approach, without any extra factor.
Finally, we explain the relation between results of the
present manuscript and the existing literature. In Refs.
[20, 21], Renes and coauthors studied PA and DC in
the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) set-
ting, not in the one-shot scenario, and showed that their
asymptotic rates are equal. Subsequently in Ref [6], he
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2also studied the relation (duality) between PA and DC
in the one-shot scenario, but his bounds were not tight
enough to prove their equivalence (see Section IV A 2 for
details).
II. NOTATION
We denote the Pauli matrices along the z and the x
axis by Z and X respectively [30]. In a qubit space,
eigenstates of Z and X are denoted by |z〉 and |x˜〉 re-
spectively; i.e., Z |z〉 = (−1)z |z〉 and X |x˜〉 = (−1)x |x˜〉
with z, x ∈ {0, 1}. In an l-qubit space, we denote
|z〉 = |z1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |zl〉 and |x˜〉 = |x˜1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x˜l〉 for
z = (z1, . . . , zl), x = (x1, · · · , xl) ∈ {0, 1}l.
The measurement of eigenvalues of Z (X) is called the
the z-basis (x-basis) measurement. We say that a state
ρ is sub-normalized if Tr(ρ) ≤ 1. We denote the results
of the z-basis measurement in space U by ZU ; e.g., for a
sub-normalized state ρUV we write
ρZUV =
∑
z
(|z〉 〈z|U )ρUV (|z〉 〈z|U ). (1)
We say that ρUV is classical in Z
U if ρUV = ρZUV , i.e.,
if ρUV is invariant under the Z
U -measurement (or infor-
mally, if U is already measured in the z basis). We also
use the same terminology for the x basis and for other
spaces besides U and V .
The L1 norm of a matrix A is ‖A‖1 := Tr(
√
AA†). For
two sub-normalized states ρ, σ, the generalized fidelity is
F (ρ, σ) := ‖√ρ√σ‖1 +
√
(1− Tr(ρ))(1− Tr(σ)), and the
purified distance is P (ρ, σ) :=
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2. We say
that ρ, σ are ε-close and write ρ ≈ε σ, if P (ρ, σ) ≤ ε (see
e.g. Ref. [9]).
The conditional min- and max-entropies of a sub-
normalized state ρUV are
Hmin(U |V )ρ
:= − log min
σ≥0
{Tr(σ) : ρUV ≤ IU ⊗ σV }, (2)
Hmax(U |V )ρ
:= max
σ≥0,Tr(σ)=1
log2(|U|F (ρUV , |U|−1IU ⊗ σV )2), (3)
and their smoothed versions are
Hmin(U |V )ερ := max
ρ¯
Hmin(U |V )ρ¯, (4)
Hmax(U |V )ερ := min
ρ¯
Hmax(U |V )ρ¯, (5)
where the maximum and the minimum are evaluated for
sub-normalized states ρ¯UV ≈ε ρUV (see e.g. Ref. [9]).
III. THREE ALGORITHMS TO BE
CONSIDERED
In this section, we specify three algorithms to be con-
sidered in this paper: Privacy amplification (PA), error
correction (EC), and data compression (DC). In the next
section, these three algorithms will be shown equivalent
to each other.
A. Privacy amplification (PA)
Privacy amplification (PA) is an algorithm for extract-
ing a secret random bits, from a bit string which may be
partially leaked outside [1–3].
1. Description of the algorithm
A PA algorithm starts with a situation where the le-
gitimate player, Alice, has a classical information z ∈
{0, 1}n, and the eavesdropper, Eve, has a quantum state
ρz correlated with z. That is, there is initially a classical-
quantum (cq) state,
ρZAE =
∑
z
|z〉 〈z|A ⊗ ρzE , (6)
where Hilbert spaces A and E describe Alice’s and Eve’s
degrees of freedom, respectively. Then Alice applies a
linear function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m to z and generates
a random bits k = f(z). The function f used in this
context of PA is often called a hash function. As a result,
random bits K and Eve end up in a state
ρfKE := ρf(ZA)E =
∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗
∑
z∈f−1(k)
ρzE . (7)
2. Security criteria of PA
We say that random bits K is ideally secure, if it is uni-
formly distributed and completely unknown to Eve, i.e.,
if ρfKE = 2
−mIK ⊗ σE for a normalized state σ. How-
ever, such ideal state is unrealistic in practice. Thus it is
customary to define the security by the distance between
the actual state ρfKE and the ideal state 2
−mIK ⊗ σE .
In this paper, we particularly follow Ko¨nig et al. [8]
and measure the security by an index
QPA,f (ρZAE) := Tr(ρZAE)− 2Hmax(f(Z
A)|E)ρ−m
= Tr(ρfKE)− 2Hmax(K|E)ρf−m. (8)
Note that when ρZAE is normalized in particular,
QPA,f (ρZAE) corresponds to measuring the distance be-
tween the actual and the ideal states by the squared pu-
rified distance.
3. Justification for using the new index QPA,f
3a. Conventional criterion On the other hand, in
fact, most existing literature on PA do not use the in-
dex (8). They rather use an index
d1(ρ
f
KE) :=
∥∥∥ρfKE − 2−mIK ⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
, (9)
and say that random number K is ε-secure if 12d1(ρ
f
KE) ≤
ε (e.g. Ref. [1]). This criterion, ε-security, is prevalent
because it is explicitly shown to satisfy a desirable prop-
erty called the universal composability [22].
Even so, our use of a rather new criterion, QPA,f , can
be justified by the following two observations.
b. ε-security using the new index QPA,f The ε-
security can also be guaranteed by using QPA,f (ρZAE).
This is because QPA,f (ρZAE) bounds d1(ρ
f
KE) as
d1(ρ
f
KE) ≤ 4
√
Tr(ρ)
√
QPA,f (ρZAE) (10)
(see Appendix B for the proof).
c. Tightness of security bounds Bounds on QPA,f
thus obtained are nearly as tight as previously obtained
bounds on d1(ρ
f
KE) in many practical situations.
For example, when function f is a random function
called the universal2 function [10], we have
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) ≤ 2Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ−m (11)
(Lemma 12 of Ref. [7], or Lemma 4 of the present paper).
If we further apply (10) and Jensen’s inequality to (11),
we obtain
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤ 4
√
Tr(ρ)
√
2m−Hmin(ZA|E)ρ , (12)
which differs only by a factor of 4 from the well-known
bound called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL, or The-
orem 5.5.1 of Ref. [1]. Later, we will derive it again as
Eq. (45)). Note that this factor 4 is harmless in practice,
since it can be compensated for by reducing the length
of random bits m only by 4 bits.
In Section V, we will also show that similarly tight
bounds can be obtained for almost universal2 [11] and
almost dual universal2 hash functions [12, 13].
4. LHLs of the conventional type and of the new type
In the past literature, an LHL always meant a
bound on an average of the conventional security in-
dex, EF d1(ρ
F
KE). In this paper, we will also refer
to a bound on an average of the new security index,
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE), as an LHL (e.g. (11)). When we need
to distinguish between these two types, we call them as
an LHL of the conventional type or of the new type.
B. Error correction (EC) with quantum side
information
Next we introduce a generalized form of classical error
correction (EC), which we call EC with quantum side
information. This generalized form is identical to what
we called the generalized error correction in Ref. [7], but
in this paper we will use the above name to elucidate the
relation with the data compression algorithm that we
discuss in the next subsection. From now on, whenever
we simply say EC, we mean this generalized form.
In a conventional classical EC algorithm [5], the sender
chooses a message t ∈ {0, 1}m and generates the corre-
sponding codeword c(t) ∈ {0, 1}n. The string c(t) is then
sent through a noisy channel, and output as a string x,
which is c(t) with bit flips applied probabilistically. The
receiver then decodes x to recover c(t).
On the other hand, in our EC with quantum side infor-
mation, codeword c(t) is sent through a noisy quantum
channel and output as a classical string x, plus an aux-
iliary quantum state ρ˜x. Hence, it is possible that the
decoding succeeds with a higher probability, due to side
information (i.e. hint) obtained by measuring ρ˜x. Details
are as follows.
1. Description of the algorithm
For the sake of similicity, we assume that the chan-
nel is symmetric under bit flips (i.e., binary symmetric
channel). We also assume that the error correcting code
C ⊂ {0, 1}n is linear, i.e., a linear [n,m] code. We denote
its linear syndrome function by g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−m.
a. Encoding and sending The sender chooses an
message m ∈ {0, 1}m, and the classical codeword c(t)
that corresponds to it.
b. Quantum channel The codeword c(t) is input to
the quantum channel and then output on the receiver’s
side as a classical data x and a quantum state ρ˜x.
c. Decoding The receiver performs the following de-
coding algorithm using x and ρ˜x.
1. Calculate the syndrome s = g(x) ∈ {0, 1}n−m.
2. Measure ρ˜x using positive operator valued mea-
sures (POVMs) which depend on s; that is, Ms =
{Ms,e | e ∈ {0, 1}n} satisfying ∑eMs,e = I. The
result e is the estimated error pattern.
3. Output y = x+ e as the estimated codeword.
2. Performance index
We say that the decoding is successful when its
output y equals the correct codeword c(t); i.e.,
Pr[EC succeeds] := Pr[Y = c(T )]. We then define the
performance index of our EC to be its failure probability
(block error rate) when using the best decoder,
QEC,g := min
{Ms}
Pr[Y 6= c(T )]. (13)
As we here limit ourselves with a linear code C and
a BSC, it suffices to consider QEC,g for conditioned on
4message t = 0 and the codeword c(0) = 0; that is,
QEC,g(ρXAB) = min{Ms}
Pr[Y 6= 0 |T = 0]
= min
{Ms}
Pr[Y 6= 0 | ρXAB ], (14)
where
ρXAB :=
∑
x
|x˜〉 〈x˜|A ⊗ ρ˜xB (15)
denotes the output of the quantum channel on input
c(0) = 0. Here we particularly chose to encode the clas-
sical information x in the x basis.
C. Data compression (DC) with quantum side
information
Similarly, a generalization of classical data compression
(DC) is known, called DC with quantum side information
[6, 9, 21]. From now on, whenever we simply say DC, we
mean this generalized type.
In a conventional classical DC algorithm [5], given a
classical data x ∈ {0, 1}n, one generates the correspond-
ing compressed data g(x) ∈ {0, 1}m, using a compression
function g, and stores it. After some time passes, one
decodes g(x) to restore x.
On the other hand, in DC with quantum side informa-
tion [6, 9, 21], there is an additional set of sub-normalized
quantum states ρ˜x which correspond to x and satisfy∑
Trρ˜x = 1. The player can store ρ˜x along with the
classical compressed data g(x), and also use it for de-
coding. Thus, as in the EC algorithm of the previous
subsection, it is possible that the decoding succeeds with
a higher probability, due to side information (i.e. hint)
obtained by measuring ρ˜x. Details are as follows.
1. Description of the algorithm
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the com-
pression function g : {0, 1}n →∈ {0, 1}m is linear.
a. Encoding Choose variable x with probability
Pr[XA = x] = Tr(ρ˜x). Then output the compressed data
s = g(x) of x, along with the corresponding quantum
side information ρ˜x.
b. Decoding Receive s ∈ {0, 1}n−m and state ρ˜xB as
inputs. Measure ρ˜xB using a POVM M
s = {Ms,e | e ∈
{0, 1}n}, and output x′ = e as the estimated value of x.
2. Performance index
We say that the decoding is successful when its output
x′ equals the correct data x; Pr[DC succeeds] = Pr[X ′ =
XA]. We then define the performance index of DC with
quantum side information to be its failure probability
when using the best decoder,
QDC,g({ρ˜x}) := min
{Ms}
Pr[X ′ 6= XA | {ρ˜x}] (16)
If we particularly choose to encode the classical data
x in the x basis, then the correlation between x and ρ˜x
can be represented by a single quantum state ρXAB =∑
x |x˜〉 〈x˜|⊗ ρ˜x, which has the identical form to the state
ρXAB of (15), which is used in EC. That is, though ρXAB
was originally introduced to describe the quantum chan-
nel of EC, it can also be regarded as describing the initial
state of DC. In this notation, the probability QDC,g of
(16) can be considered as a function of ρXAB ,
QDC,g({ρ˜x}) = QDC,g(ρXAB)
= min
{Ms}
Pr[X ′ 6= XA | ρXAB ]. (17)
D. Note on the basis choices of the classical
information
In the above specification of algorithms, for each al-
gorithm we assigned a particular orthogonal basis, the z
or the x basis, for encoding the classical variable z or x.
That is, we assumed that variable z in PA is encoded in
the z basis, whereas variable x in EC and DC is encoded
in the x basis.
We note that we here used these particular bases solely
for the purpose of simplifying the discussion of the fol-
lowing sections, where we prove the equivalence of the
three algorithms. We stress that we have no other rea-
son for these particular choices. For example, when one
implements any one of the three algorithms in practice,
one can use an arbitrary orthogonal basis for encoding
classical variables, even besides the z and the x bases.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Next we present the two main results of this paper.
The first result is that all three algorithms described
above are actually equivalent. That is, if any one of
the three is specified, the other two can also be defined
uniquely, and in addition, the indices, QPA, QEC, QDC,
of all the three algorithms thus obtained are equal.
The second result is that an leftover hashing lemma
(LHL) for PA and coding theorems for EC and DC with
quantum side information, are also equivalent. That is,
given either an LHL for PA, or a coding theorem for EC
or DC, one can also derive the other two propositions
(LHL or coding theorem) uniquely. In this case also, the
three propositions thus obtained are all equivalent.
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FIG. 1: The state ρZAE that specifies the PA algorithm, and
the state ρXAB that specifies EC and DC can be converted to
each other uniquely, as shown above (cf. Section IV A 1). In
these processes, one also obtains a pure tripartite state ρABE
satisfying the condition ρAE = ρZAE or ρAB = ρXAB . For
later convenience, we call this type of ρABE the standard form
(see Definition 2).
A. Equivalence of the three algorithms
1. How to construct all the three algorithms from any given
one of them
First we show how, given a specification of any one of
the three algorithms (PA, and EC and DC with quantum
side information), one can also specify the other two algo-
rithms uniquely. More precisely, we show how to convert
ρZAE and function f , which specify the environment and
the algorithm in PA, to their counterparts ρXAB and g
in EC and DC, and vice versa.
a. Choice of the state When given either state ρZAE
or ρXAB , one can always define the other state uniquely
by the following procedure (Fig. 1).
1. Define a tripartite pure state ρABE by purifying
ρZAE or ρXAB .
(E.g., if ρZAE is given, introduce ancilla space B
and let ρABE such that ρZAE = TrB(|ρ〉 〈ρ|ABE).)
2. Trace out the unnecessary one of spaces B and E.
3. Measure space A in the appropriate basis, of the z
and x bases.
(E.g., in order to obtain ρXAB , perform the X
A-
measurement on ρAB = TrE(|ρ〉 〈ρ|ABE).)
The pure state ρABE obtained here satisfies ρAE =
ρZAE or ρAB = ρXAB by definition. For later conve-
nience, we call this type of ρABE the standard form.
Definition 1 (Standard form). We say that a sub-
normalized tripartite state ρABE is in the standard form,
if it is pure, and satisfies either of the conditions below,
• ρAE is classical in ZA (i.e., ρAE = ρZAE),
• ρAB is classical in XA (i.e., ρAB = ρXAB).
b. Choice of the function Also, when given either
function f or g, one can always define the other function,
such that f and g becomes a dual pair in the following
sense.
Definition 2 (Dual function pair [13, 23]). Suppose a
pair of linear functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m and g :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−m is given, and can be written f(x) =
fxT , g(x) = gxT using m×n matrices f, g. Also suppose
that functions f, g are both surjective (i.e., matrices f, g
are of full rank). We say that functions f, g are dual, if
the corresponding matrices f, g satisfy fgT = 0.
We will often write f ⊥ g or g = f⊥ or f = g⊥, to say
that f , g are dual.
Note that the surjectivity of f and g here is not really
a restriction. If given f or g is not surjective, one can
always redefine it to be surjective by discarding some of
its its output bits, without affecting the indices of the
corresponding algorithm, QPA, QEC, and QDC.
2. Equivalence of the three algorithms
For the three algorithms specified above, their indices,
QPA, QEC, QDC, are all equal, as shown in the following
theorem (also see Fig. 2). In addition, they can all be
expressed by the conditional min- and max-entropies.
Theorem 1. For a dual pair of functions, f and g (=
f⊥), and for a sub-normalized state ρABE in the standard
form,
QPA,f (ρZAE) = Q
EC,g(ρXAB) = Q
DC,g(ρXAB)
= Tr(ρ)− 2Hmax(f(ZA)|E)ρ−m
= Tr(ρ)− 2−Hmin(XA|B,g(XA))ρ . (18)
In other words, evaluating the security of PA is equiv-
alent to evaluating the performances of EC and DC. The
proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
The difference between Theorem 1 and the previous
result is as follows. In Ref. [6], Renes also discussed the
relation between PA and DC in a similar setting, but his
bounds were not tight enough to prove their equivalence.
As a proof of this observation, we note that the bound
pguess(Z|B)ψ ≥ 1 −
√
2 in Theorem 4 of Ref. [6] can
be improved to pguess(Z|B)ψ ≥ 1− 2 by combining our
Theorem 1 and Eq. (9.110) of Ref. [14].
B. Random functions F,G
Next suppose that one chooses function f (or g) ran-
domly from a given set F (or G) with a given probability
p(f) (or q(g)), every time one executes the algorithm.
This corresponds to the case where one uses a random
hash function in PA, or a random code in EC and DC.
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Algorithms
Indices
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FIG. 2: The indices QPA, QEC, QDC of the three algorithms
are equal (Section IV A 2), if their inputs ρZAE and ρXAE
are related via tripartite state ρABE in the standard form (cf.
Fig. 1), and if functions f and g are dual (cf. Definition 2).
Even in this setting, Theorem 1 is true, as long as f
and g are randomized in such a way that their duality is
maintained. Details are as follows.
In order to simplify the notation of these random func-
tions f, g, from now on, we will consider them as random
variables and write them in uppercase F,G. In this no-
tation, the occurrence probability of f , for example, is
denoted Pr[F = f ] = p(f), and the expected value of
r(f), a function r of f , is EF r(F ) =
∑
f∈F p(f)r(f).
The same is true for function g.
Then we say that a pair of random functions F,G is
dual, if they are chosen randomly with their duality (in
the sense of Definition 2) maintained; that is,
Definition 3. We say that a pair of random functions
F,G is dual, if they are chosen from sets of the same size,
F = {f1, f2, . . . }, G = {g1, g2, . . . }, respectively, and if
each function pair fi, gi is dual (in the sense of Definition
2) and is chosen with the same probability, i.e.,
fi ⊥ gi and Pr[F = fi] = Pr[G = gi] for ∀i. (19)
We also write F ⊥ G or G = F⊥ or F = G⊥, if F , G
are dual.
By using this notation, we can state an averaged ver-
sion of Theorem 1 as follows.
Corollary 1. Let F,G be a pair of dual random func-
tions, and ρABE be a sub-normalized state in the standard
form, then
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE)
= EGQ
EC,G(ρXAB) = EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB)
= Tr(ρ)− EF 2Hmax(F (ZA)|E)ρ−m
= Tr(ρ)− EG 2−Hmin(XA|B,G(XA)ρ . (20)
C. Equivalence of leftover hashing lemmas (LHL)
and coding theorems
1. Equivalence of LHLs and coding theorems
If the average security index EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE), appear-
ing in Corollary 1, can be bounded by some function of
the initial state ρZAE , it will be called a leftover hashing
lemma (LHL). Similarly, if the average failure probability
EGQ
EC,G(ρXAB) of EC (or EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB) of DC) can
be bounded by some function of the environment state
ρXAE , it will be called a coding theorem.
We can show that these LHLs and coding theorems are
equivalent, if we combine Corollary 1 and the duality of
min- and max-entropies (Lemma 1 below).
Theorem 2 (Equivalence of an LHL and coding theo-
rems). Let F,G be a pair of dual random functions, r
be a function, and ρZAE and ρXAB be normalized states.
Then the following three inequalities are equivalent; that
is, if any one of them is true, then all of them are true.
• An LHL for PA using F (= G⊥),
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) ≤ r(Hmin(ZA|E)ρ). (21)
• Coding theorem for EC using G (= F⊥),
EGQ
EC,G(ρXAB) ≤ r(n−Hmax(XA|B)ρ). (22)
• Coding theorem for DC using G (= F⊥),
EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB) ≤ r(n−Hmax(XA|B)ρ). (23)
This theorem is a direct consequence of Corollary 1
above, and Lemma 1 below. The left hand sides of (21),
(22), (23) are equal due to Corollary 1, and the right
hands are also equal due to Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Entropic uncertainty relation [24], and its
equality condition [25]). Let A be an n-qubit space and
ρABE be a sub-normalized pure state. Then for ε ≥ 0,
we have [24]
Hεmax(X
A|B)ρ +Hεmin(ZA|E)ρ ≥ n. (24)
The inequality holds if ρABE is in the standard form [25].
2. Equivalence of the generalized bounds
We note that Theorem 2 above can also be generalized
in a straightforward way.
In Theorem 2, we implicitly assumed that the av-
erage security index EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) of PA should be
bounded by a function of its initial state ρZAE , and also
that the failure probability EGQ
EC,G(ρXAB) of EC (or
EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB) of DC) should be bounded by its envi-
ronment state ρXAB . However, as one can see from the
7proof of Theorem 2, such restriction is not in fact essen-
tial in our formalism. Rather, we may consider bounds of
the generalized forms by removing such restriction, and
prove their equivalence.
Theorem 3 (Generalization of Theorem 2). Let F,G be
a pair of dual random functions, r be a function, and
ρABE be a normalized state in the standard form. Then
the six inequalities of the form
a ≤ r(b) (25)
are all equivalent, where
a ∈ {EF QPA,F (ρZAE), EGQEC,G(ρXAB),
EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB)},
b ∈ {Hmin(ZA|E)ρ, n−Hmax(XA|B)ρ}.
That is, if one inequality of the form (25) is true, then
all the six are true.
V. APPLICATION 1: LEFTOVER HASHING
LEMMAS FOR (DUAL) UNIVERSAL2
FUNCTIONS F , AND THE CORRESPONDING
CODING THEOREMS
Next we apply our main results of the previous sec-
tion, Theorem 3 in particular, to explicit examples of
dual random function pair, F and G (= F⊥).
Specifically, we choose F be the three classes of hash
functions that are commonly used for PA: the universal2
[10], the almost universal2 [11], and the dual universal2
functions [12, 13]. Then we prove LHLs of the new type
(i.e. bounds on EF Q
PA,F ; cf. III A 4) for these F .
Further, we apply Theorem 3 to the new LHLs thus
obtained, and demonstrate that the coding theorems for
EC and DC using the dual random function F⊥ follows
automatically.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the LHLs and the
coding theorems obtained below are new results that have
not been obtained previously (also see the first paragraph
of Section V B).
A. Basic strategy
The basic strategy here is to borrow previous results
related with LHLs of the conventional form (i.e. bounds
on the standard security index EF d1(ρ
F
KE)) [1, 12, 13,
26], and convert them to LHLs of the new type. The
actual procedure is as follows.
1. Previous derivation of LHLs of the conventional form
First we review the previous results of Refs. [1, 12, 13,
26]. In these papers, LHLs of the conventional form were
obtained by the following two steps.
1. Prove a bound of the form
EF d2(ρ
F
KE |σE) ≤ 2−mr(H2(ρZAE |σE)), (26)
where r(·) is a non-increasing function, and d2(·)
and H2(·|·) are defined by
d2(ρKE |σE)
:= Tr
{((
ρKB − 2−mIK ⊗ ρE
) (
IK ⊗ σ−1/2E
))2}
,
(27)
H2(ρZAE |σE) := − log Tr
{(
ρZAE
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2E
))2}
(28)
for a normalized σ (see, e.g., [1]).
2. By using relations
d1(ρ
f
KE) ≤
√
2md2(ρ
f
KE |σE), (29)
Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ ≤ H2(ρZAE |σE) (30)
which hold for a normalized σ (see Ref. [1] for
the proofs), and by using Jensen’s inequality, one
obtains an LHL of the conventional form,
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤
√
r(Hmin(ZA|E)ρ). (31)
2. How to derive the new type of LHLs
As we have seen above, bounds of the form (26) have
already been proved for some random functions F [1, 12,
13, 26]. These bounds can readily be converted to the
new type of LHLs (i.e. bounds on EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE)) by
using the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let ρZAE be a normalized state, F be a
random function, and r be a non-increasing function. If
we have a bound of the form
EF d2(ρ
F
KE |ρE) ≤ 2−mr(H2(ρZAE |ρE)) (32)
(i.e., Inequality (26) with σE = ρE), then we have an
LHL for PA using F ,
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) ≤ r(Hmin(ZA|E)ρ), (33)
and coding theorems for EC and DC using G = F⊥,
EF Q
EC,F⊥(ρXAB) = EF Q
DC,F⊥(ρXAB)
≤ r(n−Hmax(XA|B)ρ), (34)
which holds for a normalized state ρXAB.
Note here that if we apply (10) and Jensen’s inequal-
ity to Inequality (33), we again derive an LHL of the
conventional type
EF d1(ρKE) ≤ 4
√
r(Hmin(ZA|E)ρ). (35)
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of four from the previous result (31), which was obtained
without using (33). In this sense we say that the new
bound (33) is nearly as tight as the previous bound (31).
3. Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 can be proved by using Theorem 2 and the
following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. For any random hash function F , and for a
normalized state ρZAE,
QPA,f (ρZAE) ≤ 2md2(ρfKE |ρE). (36)
Proof. According to Ref. [27], we have
H˜↓1/2(K|E)ρ ≥ H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ, (37)
where
H˜↓1/2(K|E)ρ := 2 log2 F (IK ⊗ ρE , ρKE), (38)
H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ := − log2 Tr
{(
ρKE
(
IK ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2}
.
(39)
Also by definition of Hmax(K|E)ρ and H˜↓1/2(K|E)ρ, we
have Hmax(K|E)ρ ≥ H˜↓1/2(K|E)ρ. Thus
QPA,f (ρ) ≤ 1− 2−m+H˜↓1/2(K|E)ρ
≤ 1− 2−m+H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ ≤ 2m−H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ − 1
= 2mTr
{(
ρKE
(
IK ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2}
− 1
= 2md2(ρKE |ρE), (40)
where in the second line we used 1 − 1/x ≤ x − 1 for
x > 0.
Lemma 3. For any random hash function F , and for a
normalized state ρZAE,
Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ ≤ H2(ρZAE |ρE). (41)
Proof. H2(ρZAE |ρE) equals the quantity H˜↓2 (ZA|E)ρ de-
fined in Ref. [27], and Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ equals H˜↑∞(ZA|E)ρ
also defined in the same paper. Hence it suffices to show
H˜↑∞(Z
A|E)ρ ≤ H˜↓2 (ZA|E)ρ. (42)
This inequality follows by substituting α = ∞ in Eq.
(48), Corollary 4, Ref. [27].
B. Explicit examples of an LHL and the
corresponding coding theorems
Next we apply Theorem 4 above to three examples
of random functions F . To the best of our knowledge,
all lemmas in this subsection, except Lemma 4, are new
results that have not been obtained previously.
1. Case where F is universal2
The first example of F is the universal2 function. This
is the most commonly used random functions for PA.
Definition 4 (Linear universal2 function [10]). A linear
random function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is universal2 if
Pr[F (x) = 0] ≤ 2−m for ∀x 6= 0. (43)
a. Leftover hashing lemma For this type of F , an
inequality of the type of (26) is already known, which
takes the form
EF d2(ρKE |σE) ≤ 2−H2(ρZAE |σE) (44)
for a normalized ρZAE (Lemma 5.4.3, Ref. [1]). If one
applies relations (29) and (30) to this inequality, one ob-
tains an LHL of the conventional form,
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤
√
Tr(ρ)
√
2m−Hmin(ZA|E)ρ (45)
for a sub-normalized ρZAE (Theorem 5.5.1 of Ref. [1]).
On the other hand, if we instead apply the former half
of Theorem 4 to (44), we obtain an LHL of the new type.
Lemma 4 (LHL for PA using a universal2 hash function,
in terms of QPA (Lemma 12, Ref. [7])). For a universal2
function F , and for a sub-normalized state ρZAE,
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) ≤ 2m−Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ . (46)
As noted in Section III A 3 a, this LHL of the new type
is nearly as tight as the LHL (45) of the conventional
type, which has been obtained previously for the same
type of F .
b. Coding theorems On the other hand, if we apply
Theorem 2 to Lemma 4, we readily obtain coding the-
orems for EC and DC using G (= F⊥), with F being
universal2.
Lemma 5 (Coding theorems for EC and DC using a
dual universal2 function (Lemma 12, Ref. [7])). Let G
be a random function whose dual G⊥ is universal2 (or
equivalently, let G be a dual universal2 function; see Def-
inition 6). Then for a sub-normalized state ρXAB,
EGQ
EC,G(ρXAB) = EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB)
≤ 2Hmax(XA|B)ρ−(n−m). (47)
2. Case where F is almost universal2
The second example of F is a generalization of the
universal2 function above, which is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Linear almost universal2 function [11]).
Let δ ∈ R be a parameter. A linear random function
F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is δ-almost universal2 if
Pr[F (x) = 0] ≤ 2−mδ for ∀x 6= 0. (48)
We note that δ must satisfy (2n−2m)/(2n−1) ≤ δ, as
can be shown by a simple argument [11]. Note that the
universal2 case of the previous subsection corresponds to
δ = 1, near the minimum value.
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well, an inequality of the type of (26) is already known,
EF d2(ρ
F
KE |ρE) ≤ 2−m(δ − 1) + 2−H2(ρZAE |ρE) (49)
for a normalized ρZAE (Lemma 5 of Ref. [26]), as well as
an LHL of the conventional type
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) (50)
≤ inf
ε>0
1
2
√
δ − 1 + 2m−H2(ρZAE |ρE)+log(2/ε2+1) + ε
(Lemma 2 of Ref. [26]).
By applying the former half of Theorem 4 to (49), we
obtain an LHL of the new type.
Lemma 6 (LHL for PA using an almost universal2 hash
function, in terms of QPA). For a universal2 hash func-
tion F and for a sub-normalized state ρZAE,
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) ≤ (δ−1)Tr(ρ)+2m−Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ . (51)
Note that if we set δ = 1, we again obtain Lemma
4. Also note that the bound (51) loses its meaning for
2 < δ, where its right hand exceeds one. Therefore, PA
using this type of F can only be secure when δ is confined
within a relatively small region, 1 ' (2n−2m)/(2n−1) ≤
δ < 2 (see Section VIII.B of Ref. [13] for a more detailed
argument). This seems to reflect the fact that this type of
F was originally conceived for information theoretically
secure authentication [11], and not for PA.
b. Coding theorems As in the previous subsection,
if we apply Theorem 2 to Lemma 6, we readily obtain
coding theorems for EC and DC using a dual random
function G (= F⊥).
Lemma 7 (Coding theorems for EC and DC using an al-
most dual universal2 function). Let G be a random func-
tion whose dual function G⊥ is δ-almost universal2 (or
equivalently, let G be a δ-almost dual universal2 function;
see Definition 6). Then for a sub-normalized state ρXAB,
EGQ
EC,G(ρXAB) = EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB)
≤ (δ − 1)Tr(ρ) + 2Hmax(XA|B)ρ−(n−m). (52)
3. Case where G is almost universal2, or equivalently,
where F is almost dual universal2
In the third example of random functions, we switch
properties of F and G, and let G (= F⊥) be an almost
universal2 function, instead of F . In this case, F is said
to be an almost dual universal2 function.
Definition 6 (Almost dual universal2 function [12, 13]).
A random function F is called δ-almost dual universal2,
if its dual random function F⊥ is δ-almost universal2.
We note that for this type of F , parameter δ must
satisfy (2n − 2n−m)/(2n − 1) ≤ δ [13]. We also note
that this type of F is 2(1− 2−mδ) + (δ − 1)2n−m-almost
universal2 simultaneously [13][31].
a. Leftover hashing lemma For this type of F as
well, an inequality of the type of (26) is known [12, 13],
EF d2(ρ
F
KE |σE) ≤ 2−H2(ρZAE |σE)δ, (53)
for a normalized ρZAE .
If one applies relations (29) and (30) to this inequality,
one obtains an LHL of the conventional form,
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤
√
Tr(ρ)
√
2m−Hmin(ZA|E)ρ
√
δ (54)
for a sub-normalized ρZAE [12, 13].
On the other hand, if we instead apply the former half
of Theorem 4 to (53), we obtain an LHL of the new type.
Lemma 8 (LHL for PA using an almost dual universal2
hash function, in terms of QPA). For a δ-almost dual
universal2 hash function F , and for a sub-normalized
state ρZAE,
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) ≤ 2m−Hmin(Z
A|E)ρδ. (55)
Unlike the δ-almost universal2 function of the previous
subsection (see the paragraph below Lemma 6), PA using
this type of F is secure even for δ exponentially larger
than one. Hence, this type of F provides a much larger
class of secure functions for PA. Exploiting this property,
in Ref. [23] we proposed many useful examples of F ,
such as, efficiently computable hash functions requiring
a small random seed.
b. Coding theorems Again by applying Theorem 2
to Lemma 8, we readily obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 9 (Coding theorems for EC and DC using an
almost universal2 function). For a δ-almost universal2
function G, and for a sub-normalized state ρXAB,
EGQ
EC,G(ρXAB) = EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB) (56)
≤ 2Hmax(XA|B)ρ−(n−m)δ.
This lemma generalizes and improves the first inequal-
ity given in Theorem 1 of Ref. [21], which essentially
says, in our notation,
EGQ
DC,G(ρXAB) ≤ 4
√
2Hmax(X
A|B)ρ−(n−m) (57)
for normalized ρXAB and for δ = 1.
VI. APPLICATION 2: EQUIVALENCE OF THE
TWO APPROACHES TO THE SECURITY
PROOF OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
There are two major approaches for the security proof
of quantum key distribution (QKD):
• Leftover hashing lemma (LHL)-based ap-
proach, where one makes use of an LHL [1].
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• Phase error correction (PEC)-based ap-
proach [15–19], where one transforms a given QKD
protocol mathematically to a EC algorithm on the
phase degree of freedom of its sifted key.
Previously we have proved that these two approaches are
equivalent, in the sense that a proof of one approach can
always be converted to the one of the other approach
without affecting the resulting security bound [7].
Below, we will apply the results obtained in this paper
to simplify and improve our previous proof in Ref. [7].
The proof below is improved in that it is valid for a larger
classes of hash functions. That is, the equivalence holds
for the case where the random function F for PA is al-
most universal2 [11] and almost dual universal2 [12, 13],
while previously [7] we treated only the case where F is
universal2 [10].
Further, utilizing the knowledge gained in this new
proof, we propose a method to simplify the PEC-based
proof. That is, we propose to evaluate the random-
ness of Alice’s phase degrees of freedom by the smooth
max-entropy, rather than by the phase error rate. This
method has an additional merit that every step of the
proof becomes equivalent to that of the corresponding
LHL-based proof. As a result, one is guaranteed to reach
exactly the same security bound as in the LHL-based
approach, without any extra factor.
A. Quick review of the two approaches
We begin by reviewing these approaches concentrating
on typical cases, though not completely general.
1. Typical QKD protocol
First, we specify what we mean by a typical QKD pro-
tocol.
a. Participants and their degrees of freedom There
are two legitimate players, Alice and Bob, who want to
share a secure key, and an eavesdropper Eve.
We let space A be Alice’s n-qubit space for storing
her sifted key, and B be all other degrees of freedom of
the legitimate players. Note here that space B generally
includes Alice’s degrees of freedom, besides Bob’s.
We also let space E be all degrees of freedom of Eve.
b. Protocol For the sake of simplicity we limit our-
selves with entanglement-based protocol. We note that
we do not lose generality here, since a prepare-and-
measure protocols can always be transformed to an
entanglement-based protocol by introducing ancillary
spaces appropriately.
Initially, Alice, Bob, and Eve are in a state µABE .
Alice and Bob then perform the following protocol.
1. Sample measurement Alice and Bob measure
their reduced state µAB , and determine whether
they abort the protocol or not.
2. Corrected key generation Alice and Bob each
performs a measurement in space AB indepen-
dently. They then perform information reconcili-
ation together, and generate their corrected keys
z ∈ {0, 1}n for Alice, and z′ ∈ {0, 1}n for Bob re-
spectively.
We assume that Alice stores her corrected key z in
space A in the z basis, or in ZA basis. We denote
by ρZAE the sub-normalized state after this step of
Alice’s z and Eve’s degree of freedom E.
3. Secret key generation Alice and Bob each ap-
plies PA using a random function F to their sifted
keys z, z′ respectively, and generates their secret
keys k, k′.
2. Security criterion of QKD
In order to show the security of a QKD protocol as a
whole, it suffices to bound the sum of the failure proba-
bility of IR, εIR = Pr[Z 6= Z ′] (≥ Pr[K 6= K ′]), and the
security index of Alice’ secret key EF d1(ρ
F
KE) (see e.g.
Remark 6.1.3 of Ref. [1]).
The probability εIR can easily be bounded using the
theory of classical error correcting codes.
As a result, the security analysis of QKD is reduced to
that of Alice’s secret key, i.e., to bounding EF d1(ρ
F
KE).
3. Leftover hashing lemma (LHL)-based approach
For a QKD protocol of the above type, a typical LHL-
based proof proceeds as follows.
a. Assumption One assumes that the sample mea-
surement is designed so that the resulting sub-normalized
state ρZAE satisfies
Hthmin ≤ Hεmin(ZA|E)ρ (58)
with Hthmin being a predetermined constant.
One also assumes that an LHL for the random function
F has already been proved. In practice, it suffices to
assume that Alice and Bob use one of the examples of
F that we studied in Section V, i.e., universal2, δ-almost
universal2 (with δ sufficiently small), and δ-almost dual
universal2 functions.
b. Security proof As mentioned in Section VI A 2,
in order to prove the security of the QKD protocol, one
needs to bound the security index of Alice’s secret key,
EF d1(ρ
F
KE). For this purpose, one uses an LHL.
For example, if F is universal2, EF d1(ρ
F
KE) can be
bound by using an LHL (45). By substituting (58) to
(45), one obtains a security bound
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤ 2ε+
√
2m−Hthmin . (59)
Also for the case where F is δ-almost universal2, one
can obtain a similar security bounds using an LHL (50).
For the case of δ-almost universal2, one can use (54).
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4. Phase error correction (PEC)-based approach
On the other hand, a typical PEC-based proof proceeds
as follows.
a. Assumption This approach starts by deriving a
virtual state ρXAB . That is, one applies to state ρZAE
(defined in step 2 of Section VI A 1 b) the procedure given
in Section IV A and Fig. 1, and generates ρXAB along
with a tripartite state ρABE in the standard form.
Then one supposes that Alice and Bob together per-
form EC on ρXAB . One also assumes that the sample
measurement step and the random function F are de-
signed, so that the EC using the dual random function
F⊥ fails with a probability,
EF Q
EC,F⊥(ρXAB) ≤ QEC,th, (60)
where QEC,th is a predetermined constant.
b. Security proof As mentioned in Section VI A 2,
one needs to bound the security index of Alice’s secret
key, EF d1(ρ
F
KE). For this purpose, one uses an inequality
d1(ρ
f
KE) ≤ 2
√
2
√
QEC,f⊥(ρXAB), (61)
which has been known previously (see e.g. Refs. [7, 28]).
By substituting condition (60) to (61), one obtains a se-
curity bound
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤ 2
√
2
√
EF QEC,F
⊥(ρXAB)
≤ 2
√
2
√
QEC,th, (62)
where used Jensen’s inequality is used in the first line.
c. Typical method for satisfying the assumption In
most literature of the PEC-based approach, one designs
the sample measurement step and determines the upper
bound QEC,th on the average failure probability of the
virtual EC, as follows.
1. One chooses a POVM N = {Ne | ∑eNe = IB} in
space B, and calculates the classical distribution
p(x, e) := Tr {ρXAB (|x˜〉 〈x˜|A ⊗Ne)}.
2. One designs the sample measurement step such
that the randomness of x seen in p(x, e) becomes
sufficiently small, for example, such that the phase
error rate eph :=
∑
x 6=0,e p(x, e) becomes suffi-
ciently small.
3. Using the theory of classical EC, one obtains an
upper bound on the average failure probability of
the EC. This bound serves as QEC,th.
The POVM N here plays the same role as Ms of Section
III B 1 c; i.e., they both provide a hint to boost the perfor-
mance of the decoder (cf. 3rd paragraph, Section III B).
The difference is that unlike Ms, N does not depend on
the syndrome s = f⊥(x).
d. Remarks There are two remarks regarding the
above procedure.
First, in the context of the QKD, state ρXAB is often
called a virtual state since it is not necessarily realized
in the actual QKD protocol, unlike ρZAE . It is rather a
mathematical artifact introduced for simplifying security
proofs. For the same reason, the EC on the phase error
correction considered above is often called the virtual EC.
Second, while the bound (61) has been known previ-
ously, it can alternatively be regarded as a consequence
of the equivalence of EC and PA, which we have shown
in Section IV. Indeed, if we combine (10) and Theo-
rem 1, we obtain a slightly weaker inequality d1(ρ
f
KE) ≤
4
√
QEC,f⊥(ρXAB).
B. How to convert one approach to the other
By using our results of Section IV, one can always con-
vert proofs of these two approaches to each other, while
keeping the bounds (59) and (62) essentially the same.
1. Conversion from the LHL-based to the PEC-based
When given a LHL-based proof, one can always convert
it to an alternative proof of the PEC-based approach.
The basic idea is as follows. When given ρZAE , one
can always reconstruct the (sub-normalized) virtual state
ρXAB , by using the procedure of Fig. 1. If one applies
EC to ρXAB thus obtained, the situation now becomes
equivalent to the PEC-based approach. In addition, the
failure probability of the EC there equals the security of
PA in the original LHL-based proof,
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) = EF Q
EC,F⊥(ρXAB). (63)
This is because, by definition, ρZAE and ρXAB here are
related via a standard form ρABE , and Corollary 1 can
be applied. If one further applies (61), one can recover
essentially the same bound as the original LHL approach,
though one is working in the PEC-based approach.
We will see this procedure in detail for the case where F
is universal2. (For the case where F is almost universal2
or almost dual universal2, one also can perform a similar
procedure using Lemma 6 or 8).
By the definition of the smooth min-entropy, there
exists a sub-normalized state ρ¯ZAE which is ε-close to
ρZAE and satisfies Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ¯ = Hεmin(ZA|E)ρ. Let
ρ¯XAB be the virtual sub-normalized state corresponding
to ρ¯ZAE . Then by applying Corollary 1 and Lemma 4,
one obtains
EF Q
EC,F⊥(ρ¯XAB) = EF Q
PA,F (ρ¯ZAE)
= 2m−Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ¯ = 2m−H
ε
min(Z
A|E)ρ
≤ 2m−Hthmin . (64)
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This means that the situation is now equivalent to that
of the PEC-based approach where assumption (60) holds
for ρ¯XAB with Q
EC,th = 2m−H
th
min . Therefore by applying
(62), one obtains a bound,
EF d1(ρ¯
F
KB) ≤ 2
√
2
√
2
1
2 (m−Hthmin), (65)
and also the security bound for the actual state ρFKB ,
EF d1(ρ
F
KB) ≤ 2ε+ 2
√
2
√
2
1
2 (m−Hthmin), (66)
which is identical to (59), except for the presence of the
factor of 2
√
2.
2. Conversion from the PEC-based to the LHL-based
approach
Conversely, when given a security proof of the PEC-
based approach, one can always convert it to a proof of
the LHL-based approach.
To this end, one repeats the the reasoning of the first
two paragraph of Section VI B 1, and reaches Eq. (63).
Then by substituting condition (60) to (63), one obtains
a LHL of the new type (see Section III A 4),
EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE) ≤ QEC,th. (67)
The situation is now equivalent to that of the LHL-
based approach. If one further applies (10) to (67), one
obtains
EF d1(ρKE) ≤ 4
√
Trρ
√
EF QPA,F (ρZAE)
≤ 4
√
QEC,th, (68)
which is the same as (62), except that it is looser by the
factor of
√
2.
C. Evaluating the phase randomness by the
smooth max-entropy
In Section VI A 4 c, we explained a typical method
used in the PEC-based approach for designing the sample
measurement step and for determining the bound QEC,th
on the average failure probability of the virtual EC.
However, this method has a problem that there is no
fixed methodology for finding the appropriate POVM N .
We here propose a method to avoid this problem.
Namely, we point out that it is convenient to evaluate the
randomness of the phase degrees of freedom XA by the
conditional max-entropy Hεmax(X
A|B)ρ, rather than by
the phase error rate eph mentioned in Section VI A 4 c. In
this method one can exploit the coding theorems for EC
(e.g. those derived in Section V B) to determine QEC,th,
without being bothered by the choice of the POVN N .
This method has an additional merit that every step of
the proof becomes equivalent to that of the LHL-based
approach of Section VI A 3. As a result, one is guaranteed
to reach exactly the same security bound as in the LHL-
based approach, without any extra factor.
1. PEC-based approach using the smooth max-entropy
a. Assumptions As in Section VI A 4 a, we derive
the (sub-normalized) virtual state ρXAB by the proce-
dure given in Section IV A and Fig. 1. Then we assume
the following two items.
1. The sample measurement step is designed such that
the virtual (sub-normalized) state ρXAB ends up
having the smooth min-entropy bounded as
Hεmax(X
A|B)ρ ≤ n−Hthmin. (69)
2. The random hash function F is universal2.
These two assumptions together guarantee that there
exists a approximate virtual (sub-normalized) state ρ¯XAB
(≈ε ρXAB) which satisfies condition (60) of the PEC-
based approach, with the parameter
QEC,th = 2m−H
th
min . (70)
To see this, note that by the definition of the smooth
max-entropy, there exists a sub-normalized state ρ¯XAB
(≈ε ρXAB) satisfying Hmax(XA|B)ρ¯ = Hεmax(XA|B)ρ.
Then by applying the coding theorem for EC using F⊥
(Lemma 5) to this ρ¯XAB ,
EF Q
EC,F⊥(ρ¯XAB) ≤ 2Hmax(X
A|B)ρ¯−(n−m)
= 2H
ε
max(X
A|B)ρ−(n−m)
≤ 2m−Hthmin . (71)
b. Security proof Hence we can apply the PEC-
based proof of Section VI A 4 to the approximate virtual
(sub-normalized) state ρ¯XAB . By substituting (71) to
(61), we obtain
EF d1(ρ¯
F
KE) ≤ 2
√
2
√
2H
ε
max(X
A|B)ρ−(n−m). (72)
Since ρ¯fKE ≈ε ρfKE , we then have an LHL which is ex-
pressed in terms of Alice’s phase degree of freedom XA,
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤ 2ε+ 2
√
2
√
2H
ε
max(X
A|B)ρ−(n−m). (73)
By substituting condition (69) to (73), we obtain
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤ 2ε+ 2
√
2
√
2m−Hthmin . (74)
2. Equivalence with the LHL-based approach
The final result (74) of the PEC-based proof above is
the same as (59) of the LHL-based proof, except for the
presence of the factor of 2
√
2. This is because we are in
fact using the same assumption and the same inequality
as in the LHL-based approach of Section VI A 2:
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• Condition (69) is equivalent to condition (58) of the
LHL-based approach.
This is because in the current situation, we have
Hεmin(Z
A|E)ρ +Hεmax(XA|B)ρ = n (75)
due to Lemma 1.
• The coding theorem (Lemma 5) that we used to
derive (71) is essentially equivalent to the LHL (45),
which is used in the LHL-based approach.
To see this, we apply Theorem 2 (the equivalence
of PA and EC) to Lemma 5, and obtain an LHL of
the new type,
EF Q
EC,F⊥(ρXAB) = EF Q
PA,F (ρZAE)
≤ 2Hmax(XA|B)ρ−(n−m)
= 2m−Hmin(Z
A|E)ρ (76)
If we then apply (10) to these inequalities, we ob-
tain an LHL of the conventional type, which differs
from (45) by a factor of 4.
Thus, in fact our proof method here is essentially
the same as the LHL-based approach that was speci-
fied in Section VI A 2. The difference is that ours is re-
formalized within the PEC-based approach.
3. Advantages of our method
From the standpoint of the PEC-based approach, we
believe that this stronger version of the equivalence is
an additional merit of our method. As a result, the ad-
vantages of our method against the typical PEC-based
approach can be summarized as follows.
1. It admits the use of the smoothing parameter ε.
2. The analysis is simple: One need not specify
POVMN , which was mentioned in Section VI A 4 c.
Once one finishes evaluating Alice’s phase random-
ness in terms of Hεmax(X
A|B)ρ, the security bound
readily follows from the LHL (73).
3. The bound thus obtained is guaranteed to be the
same as in the corresponding LHL-based proof.
4. Improved bound using the uncertainty relation
Finally, we note that the LHL expressed in terms of
Alice’s phase degree of freedom, (73), is not by itself a
new result (though we believe that our interpretation in
the PEC-based approach is). It is rather a direct conse-
quence of the entropic uncertainty relation (the former
half of Lemma 1 of this paper), which was shown previ-
ously by Tomamichel and coauthors [9, 24, 29]. More-
over, (73) can be improved by using their result.
If we substitute (24) to (45), we obtain an LHL
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤ 2ε+
√
Tr(ρ)
√
2H
ε
max(X
A|B)ρ−(n−m), (77)
which improves (73) by a factor of 2
√
2. If we then sub-
stitute condition (69) to (77), we obtain a security bound
EF d1(ρ
F
KE) ≤ 2ε+
√
2m−Hthmin , (78)
which again improves (74) by a factor of 2
√
2, and equals
(59) of the LHL-based proof exactly.
VII. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We showed that quantum algorithms of privacy ampli-
fication (PA), error correction (EC), and data compres-
sion (DC) are equivalent, if we define the security of PA
properly and and if we generalize EC and DC by adding
quantum side information.
As an application of this equivalence, we took previ-
ously known security bounds of PA, and converted them
into coding theorems for EC and DC that have not been
obtained previously. We applied these results to simplify
and improve our previous result that the two prevalent
approaches to the security proof of quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) are equivalent. We also propose a method
to simplify the security proof of QKD by using the insight
gained in this analysis.
An interesting future direction is to generalize the
equivalence by using a dual pair of K-entropies [25] for
defining the indices Q for the three algorithms. For ex-
ample, if we use the von Neumann entropy to define the
index Q for any one of the three algorithms, and if we
can still prove the equivalence, then all the three algo-
rithms will share the same definition for their indices Q.
Therefore, the equivalence in a stronger sense will be es-
tablished, and the three algorithms will become truly in-
distinguishable.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we will prove Theorem 1.
Since all terms in (18) are proportional to Tr(ρABE), it
suffices to consider the case where ρABE is normalized. In
this case, Theorem 1 follows immediately by combining
Eq. (8) and the following three lemmas.
Lemma 10. For a normalized state ρXAB and for a
function g, we have
QEC,g(ρXAB) = Q
DC,g(ρXAB)
= 1− 2−Hmin(XA|B,g(XA))ρ . (A1)
Proof. From the definitions of EC and DC, it is evident
that their indices QEC,g(ρXAB) and Q
DC,g(ρXAB) can
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both be rewritten as
QEC,g(ρXAB) = Q
DC,g(ρXAB)
= min
{Ms}
(
1−
∑
x
tr(ρ˜xMg(x),x)
)
. (A2)
Next note that the decoding of DC is equivalent to the
situation where, given a state
τ =
∑
x
|x˜〉 〈x˜|A ⊗ ρ˜xB ⊗ |g(x)〉 〈g(x)|D (A3)
(with D being a new ancillary space), one estimates
x by measuring spaces B,D. According to Ref.
[8], the success probability of this estimation equals
2Hmin(X
A|B,D)τ . Then, by noting Hmin(XA|B,D)τ =
Hmin(X
A|B, g(XA))ρ, we obtain the lemma.
Lemma 11. For a dual pair of functions f, g, and for a
normalized state ρABE, we have
QPA,f (ρZAE) ≤ QEC,g(ρXAB). (A4)
Proof. We begin by introducing a new notation: We de-
note the i-th row of a matrix f (appearing in Definition
2) by fi, and components of fi by fi1, . . . , fin. In this
notation, for example, the duality condition fgT = 0 can
be written fi · gj =
∑
k fikgjk = 0 for ∀i, j.
Next we note that the security index QPA,f for PA can
be rewritten as
QPA,f (ρZAE) (A5)
= 1− max
σ≥0,Trσ=1
F (ΠPA,f (ρABE)KE , 2
−mIK ⊗ σE)2.
by using the algorithm ΠPA,f below, which is designed
to affect spaces A,E in the same way as the actual PA.
• Equivalent algorithm for PA (ΠPA,f): Measure
space A using the operator Zfi = Zfi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Zfin
(i = 1, . . . ,m), and store the result k ∈ {0, 1}m in
space K.
Similarly, we also note that the performance index
QEC,g(ρXAB) of EC can be rewritten as
QEC,g(ρXAB)
= 1− max
{Ms}
F (|0˜〉 〈0˜|A ,ΠEC,g(ρABE)A)2. (A6)
by using the algorithm ΠEC,g below.
• Equivalent decoding algorithm for EC
(ΠEC,g):
1. Syndrome measurement: Measure space A
using an operator Xgi = Xgi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xgin
(i = 1, . . . , n−m), and record the result as the
syndrome s = (s1, . . . , sn−m) ∈ {0, 1}n−m.
2. Side information measurement: Mea-
sure space B using the POVM Ms =
{Ms,e}x′∈{0,1}n , and obtain the estimated er-
ror pattern e.
3. Bit flip: Apply the operator Ze in space A.
The state |0˜〉 〈0˜|A appearing in Eq. (A6) must take
the form |0˜〉 〈0˜|A⊗σE for some σ, when it is extended to
spaces A,E. Thus Eq. (A6) can be rewritten further as
QEC,g(ρXAB) = (A7)
1− max
{Ms},σ≥0,σ,Trσ=1
F
(|0˜〉 〈0˜|A ⊗ σE ,ΠEC,g(ρABE)AE)2 .
Further, if functions f, g are dual, the operator Zfi
of ΠPA,f , commutes with Xgi and with Zz
′
of ΠEC,g.
Thus algorithms ΠPA,f and ΠEC,g also commute with
each other. Therefore we have ΠPA,f (ΠEC,g(ρ))KE =
ΠEC,g(ΠPA,f (ρ))KE = Π
PA,f (ρ)KE , and
1−QEC,g(ρXAB) (A8)
≤ max
{Ms},σ≥0,Trσ=1
F
(
ΠPA,f (|0˜〉 〈0˜|A ⊗ σE)KE ,ΠPA,f (ΠEC,g(ρ)AE)KE
)2
= max
σ≥0,Trσ=1
F
(
ΠPA,f (|0˜〉 〈0˜|A ⊗ σE)KE ,ΠPA,f (ρ)KE
)2
= max
σ≥0,Trσ=1
F
(
IK ⊗ σE , ρfKE
)2
= 1−QPA,f (ρAE).
Lemma 12. For a dual pair of functions f, g, and for a
normalized state ρABE in the standard form, we have
Hmax(f(Z
A)|E)ρ +Hmin(XA|B, g(XA))ρ = m. (A9)
Proof. We continue to use the notation introduced in the
proof of Lemma 11. In this notation, the random number
K = f(ZA) in PA corresponds to measurement result by
operators (Zfi)A, and the syndrome S = g(X
A) in EC
corresponds to that by (Xgj )A. Since these operators,
(Zfi)A and (X
gj )A, commutes with each other for a dual
pair f, g, we can decompose space A into A = A1A2, such
that random variable K equals the result of the z basis
measurement in the m-qubit space A1, and S equals the
result of the x basis measurement in the n − m qubit
space A2, i.e., Z
A1 = K = f(ZA) and XA2 = g(XA).
In this case, Hmin(X|B,XA2)ρ = Hmin(XA1 |B,XA2)ρ
holds, and the relation (A9), which we need to prove,
takes the form
Hmax(Z
A1 |E)ρ +Hmin(XA1 |B,XA2)ρ = m. (A10)
(i) Suppose that ρAE = ρZAE . In this case, if we
measure |ρ〉ABE = |ρ〉A1A2BE in theXA2 basis, we obtain
ρA1XA2BE = 2
−(n−m)∑
t
|s˜〉 〈s˜|A2 ⊗ |τs〉 〈τs|A1BE .
(A11)
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Alternatively, if we measure ρA1A2E = ρZA1ZA2E in the
XA2 basis, we obtain
ρZA1XA2E = 2
−(n−m)IA2 ⊗ ρZA1E . (A12)
Then if we further trace out B from (A11), it should
equal (A12) by construction. Thus all |τs〉 are a pu-
rification of ρZA1E . Hence by applying Lemma 1 to
|τs〉 and space A1, we see that Hmin(XA1 |B)τs =
m − Hmax(ZA1 |E)τs = m − Hmax(ZA1 |E)ρ. Also
by applying Proposition 4.6 of Ref. [9], we ob-
tain 2Hmin(X
A1 |XA2 ,B)ρ = 2−(n−m)
∑
s 2
Hmin(X
A1 |B)τs =
2Hmax(Z
A1 |E)ρ , which proves (A10).
(ii) Suppose that ρAB = ρXAB . Then we have
ρA1A2B = ρA1XA2B = ρXA1XA2B , with ρABE being the
purification of all these states. By applying Lemma 1 to
ρABE and space A1, we obtain (A10).
Appendix B: Relation between security criteria of
privacy amplification
In section III A, we introduced quantities QPA,f (ρZAE)
and d1(ρ
f
KE) as the security index for random number
K = f(ZA) in PA. Besides these two quantities, some
literature also use security index for K,
d′1(ρ
f
KE) := min
σ≥0,Tr(σ)=1
∥∥∥ρfKE − 2−mIK ⊗ σE∥∥∥
1
. (B1)
It is straightforward to show that this quantity can be
bounded by QPA,f (ρZAE) as
1−
√
1−QPA,f (ρZAE) ≤
1
2
d′1(ρ
f
KE) ≤
√
QPA,f (ρZAE),
(B2)
if ρ is normalized (see from Eq. (9.110) of Ref. [14]).
It can also be shown that d′1(ρ
f
KE) bounds the conven-
tional security index d1(ρ
f
KE) as
d′1(ρ
f
KE) ≤ d1(ρfKE) ≤ 2d′1(ρfKE), (B3)
if ρ is normalized. The first inequality is immediate from
the definitions of d1(ρ
f
KE) and d
′
1(ρ
f
KE). The second in-
equality can be shown as∥∥∥ρfKE − 2−mIK ⊗ ρE∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥ρfKE − 2−mIK ⊗ σE∥∥∥
+
∥∥2−mIK ⊗ σE − 2−mIK ⊗ ρE∥∥
=
∥∥∥ρfKE − 2−mIK ⊗ σE∥∥∥+ ‖ρE − σE‖
≤ 2
∥∥∥ρfKE − 2−mIK ⊗ σE∥∥∥ , (B4)
where the last inequality holds from the monotonicity of
the trace distance.
Inequality (10) of section III A follows from Eqs. (B2)
and (B3).
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